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COMMENT
The Costs and Legal Impracticalities
Facing Implementation of the
European Union's Droit de Suite
Directive in the United Kingdom

Jennifer B. Pfeffer*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2001, the European Union passed a directive requiring member
countries to implement a droit de suite on the resale of art.' A droit de suite

is a resale royalty created to benefit visual artists.2 The phrase is French
and literally translated means "follow-up right."3 It gives artists an
inalienable right to hold an interest in their artwork even after they have
sold their work. 4 Every time the work is resold the artist can collect a
commission or royalty (provided the transaction meets the requirements set
out by the law mandating the droit de suite).5 The purpose of the droit de
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., University of
Virginia, 2001.
Council Directive 2001/84 of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of
the Author of an Original Work of Art, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 [hereinafter Council Directive].
The droit de suite is a mandatory royalty imposed on the sale of artwork. Some sources refer
to the droit de suite as a tax, but this paper will refer to it as a royalty because the artists and
not the government are the intended recipients of the money. See Gavin McFarlane, E.U.
and World Trade Brief: Time for the Droit de Suite?, 149 NEW L.J. 1289, 1290 (1999).
2 See Council Directive, supra note 1.
3 Jay B. Johnson, Copyright: Droitde Suite: An Artist is Entitled to Royalties Even After
He's Sold His Soul to the Devil, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 493, 493 (1992).
4 Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L.
& TECH. 1, 36 (1988); see generally Council Directive, supra note 1.
5 Johnson, supra note 3, at 493. Some stretch the reach of droit de suite beyond a royalty
interest to include an interest in the work's display or destruction. Id. The European
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suite is to allow artists to profit off of their growing reputations; 6 for
example, a starving artist who has sold a work for a pittance may profit (or
his heirs may profit) when he has risen in prominence and his work has
consequently increased in value.
The United Kingdom actively opposed the directive; 8 it worried about
the effect of the directive on its lucrative art market9 and questioned the
usefulness of the droit de suite itself.10 Even artists have protested the
directive." Nevertheless, the directive was passed 2 and the United
13
Kingdom must implement the directive within the next eight to ten years.
The United Kingdom stands to lose a lot of art business by
implementing the directive. 14 However, the British resistance to the
directive involves more than the potential loss of business. The civil law
concept of droit de suite conflicts with the British common law system.
The United Kingdom's system of law is common law; 15 conversely, the
droit de suite originated in civil law. 16 Because of the droit de suite's civil
Union's directive does not extend the reach of the droit de suite this far, and therefore does
not expect member states to include these interests in their national laws. See generally
Council Directive, supra note 1.
6 Shirine Tiwari, Artist's Resale Rights, at http://www.axa-nordstem-art.co.uk/cw/law/
law2002/resale-rights.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
7 Tiwari, supra note 6; Johnson, supra note 3. The described scenario is the stereotype
on which the droit de suite is based. See William A. Carleton, Copyright Royalties for
Visual Artists: A Display-BasedAlternative to the Droit de Suite, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 510,
536-8 (1991), (discussing the relationship between the droit de suite and the stereotype of
the starving artist); see also Jon Stanford, Economic Analysis of the Droit de Suite-The
Artist's Resale Royalty, 42 AUSTRALIAN ECON. PAPERS 386,386-87 (2003).
8 See generally Kevin A. Bell, 1999 WTD 247-4 U.K. Weekly Update: U.K. Challenges
Proposed E.U. Art Tax (Dec. 27, 1999): UK Challenges Proposed E.U. Art Tax,
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 27, 1999; Leyla Linton, Art Market threatened by E. U. Tax'
on Sales, THE INDEPENDENT, July 4, 2001 available at http://www.independent.co.uk (last
visited Oct. 19, 2002); Clare Sellars, Directive on Resale Rights for Artists, 13 ENT. L.R. 24
(2002); David Heathcoat-Armory, A Market Under Threat: How the European Union Could
Destroy the British Art Market, Centre for Policy Studies, at http://www.cps.org.uk/dha.htm;
George Moore and Matthew Warren, Artists win resale royalties, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.,
Mar. 2002, at 18.
9 Bell, supra note 8; Tiwari, supra note 6; Heathcoat-Amory, supra note 8.
10Tiwari, supra note 6; Linton, supra note 8.
11Tiwari, supra note 6; Henry Lydiate, E.U. Directives: Copyright & Resale Right, ART
MONTHLY, Nov. 2001, at 49.

12 See, e.g. Council Directive, supra note 1.
13Lydiate, supra note 11, at 49.
14 See Is London donefor?, ECONOMIST, July 24, 1997.
15 Peter Groves, Moral Rights in the UK. and Beyond, CAN. Bus. & CURRENT AFF., Apr.

2003, at 3.
16 Jimmy A. Frazier, On Moral Rights, Artist-CenteredLegislation, and the Role of the
State in Art Worlds: Notes on Building a Sociology of Copyright Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 313,
335 (1995).
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law origins, the United Kingdom will have difficulty incorporating it into
its common law system. The droit de suite is a droit moral, or a moral
right;1 7 the common law copyright law is not grounded in moral rights and
only offers moral rights limited, recent recognition." Moreover, the droit
de suite conflicts with common law policies in copyright, property, and
contract law. The United Kingdom will have an additional problem
attempting to enforce the droit de suite once it becomes law. This comment
will examine the problems the United Kingdom will face when it passes the
droit de suite legislation mandated by the European Union's directive.

II.

BEHIND THE DROITDE SUITE

A. A Brief History of the London Art Market
In the mid-nineties, thirty percent of the world's art sales took place in
London,' 9 making it the second largest art market in the world in terms of
volume after New York 20 and the largest art market in Europe. 21 London's
eminence in the art world has existed for centuries, 22 making it renowned
not only for the number of art transactions, but also for the art expertise the
city provides. 23 The British art market employs 51,000 people and has an
annual turnover of more than £2.2 billion. 2 For the United Kingdom, a lot
is a stake when considering the negative impact that a tax or royalty could
create; therefore the United Kingdom is inclined to be protective of its art
market. 25 The United Kingdom first opposed the droit de suite when the
European Union began discussing the possibility of a directive in the early

17Frazier, supra note 16, at 335. A droit moral gives artists or authors an interest in their
work after the work as left their hands. The interest is based on the theory that a work is an
extension of the author or artists' personality. The droits morals include rights affecting the
work's display or alteration. The droit de suite affects only the resale right and is the only
right included in the directive. Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists'
Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 98
(1997).
18 Groves, supra note 15, at 3.
19 Is London donefor?, supra note 14.
20 id.

21 Summary, First Authoritative Survey Commissioned by TEFAF, The European Fine

Art Foundation, 2002 at http://www.artworlddealers.com/survey.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2004) [hereinafter TEFAF].
22 Let the bad times roll, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2002.
23 id.

24 Heathcoat-Armory, supra note 8.
25 See Art Market: VAT and Droit de Suite, 589 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5"h ser.) (1998) 154
[hereinafter Parliamentary Debate]; Ian Black and Dan Atkinson, The UnitedKingdom gives
up thefight againstEuropean art sale tax, GUARDIAN, Feb. 16, 2000.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

24:533 (2004)

nineties. 26
B. The Value Added Tax
In 1994, the European Union's policies began to interfere with
London's art market by forcing the United Kingdom to impose a 2.5%
value-added tax ("VAT") on all art sales.2 7 Another E.U. directive
compelled the United Kingdom to raise the VAT to 5% in 1999.28 The
purpose of increasing the VAT was to harmonize the taxation of British art
sales with the rest of the E.U. member states 29 and end protectionism of
London's art market.3 ° After the VAT came into effect, London's art
market lost business, and many attribute this loss of business directly to the
VAT. 3 1 Between 1994 and 1998, art imports to the United States have
grown at twice the rate of art imports into Europe.32 As early as 1996, after
the imposition of the 2.5% VAT but before the 1999 increase, British art
imports dropped 28% although the value of art sold at auction worldwide
grew.33 This occurrence suggests that sellers are choosing not to sell their
art in London but instead are selling their art elsewhere.34 By 2002, a
number of auction houses and galleries displayed financial troubles by
closing, being evicted, or being sold.35
Despite the problems caused by the VAT, the British did not seem to
fight it as intensely as it did droit de suite directive.36 While the United
Kingdom did attempt to block the VAT increase, it backed down on the
VAT issue long before it did on the droit de suite.37 Even though both were
proposed around the same time, the European Union was able to pass the
VAT increase almost five years before the droit de suite.38 There is a
possible explanation for this discrepancy; the VAT was already in place and
acted as an ordinary tax 39 and so an effective philosophical argument could
26
27

Parliamentary Debate, supra note 25; Black & Atkinson, supra note 25.
Is London done for?, supra note 14. The VAT essentially acts like a sale tax.

28 id.

29 Written Question No. 51/98 by Maren Gunther to the Commission, 1998 O.J. (C 223)
93, Jan. 28, 1998; Is London donefor?, supra note 14.
30 Is London done for?, supra note 14.
31Id.; TEFAF, supra note 21.
32 TEFAF, supra note 21.
33 Is London done for?, supra note 14.
34 id.
35 Let the bad times roll, supra note 22. In addition to the long string of difficulties
detailed in the article, the "top contemporary art dealer," the Antonthy d'Offray Gallery, has
closed. Id.
36 See Black & Atkinson, supra note 25.
37 id.
38 See Let

the bad times roll, supra note 22; Is London donefor?, supra note 14.
39 See Parliamentary Debate, supra note 25.
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not be made against the VAT itself.4° However, the VAT is more far
reaching than the droit de suite, affecting the sale of all art and antiquities.41
The droit de suite directive only affects the resale of modem and
contemporary artwork.42 The United Kingdom's response to the droit de
suite seems to show that there is some characteristic of the droit de suite
that makes it more objectionable than the VAT. In a debate in the House of
Lords, it was clear that the Lords did not consider the droit de suite a mere
tax; 43 they made a clear distinction between the VAT and the droit de suite
based on the fact one is tax and the other is not. 44
C. A Brief History of the Droit de Suite
After receiving opposition from British Parliament and an outcry in the
London art market, 5 the European Union passed the directive mandating
the droit de suite in September 2001 .46 There was little opposition in other
E.U. member states because the royalty already existed in many of those
states; 47 eleven of the E.U. member states already included some form of
the droit de suite in their national laws.4 8
1. French civil law origins
The droit de suite originated in French civil law; 49 it became part of
French intellectual property law in 1920.50 However, the ideas behind droit
de suite existed long before it became codified.
Before the French
Revolution, French law was largely concerned only with economic rights, 1
but after the Revolution, moral rights became a legal interest due to the
ideologies of the Revolution and the Enlightenment. 2 Although French
law previously offered artists many legal protections, the French officially
See id.
Let the bad times roll, supra note 22.
42 Cf Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 8; see also Tiwari, supra note 6.
43 Parliamentary Debate, supra note 25.
40

41 See

44id
45

Deborah Hargreaves, U.K. Will Again Challenge European Union on Art Tax,

WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 20, 1999, 244-46 (excerpt reprinted from the Financial Times,
Dec. 20, 1999).
46 Council Directive, supra note 1.

47 Tiwari, supra note 6.
48 Id.; see also Clare McAndrew & Loma Dallas-Conte, Implementing Droit de Suite,
Research Report for the Arts Council of England, Mar. 2002, at 25-26, for detailed charts

describing the droit de suite collection practices of the states.
49 Frazier, supra note 16, at 335-36.
so LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC

PROPERTY 218 (1991); Tiwari, supra note 6.
Si Frazier, supra note 16, at 335.
52 Id.
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codified a scheme in 1920 to compensate visual 5artists
by giving them a
3
percentage of the resale value of their works of art.
The droit de suite originated in French civil law as a droit moral, or
moral right. 54 It is not indigenous to common law; 55 few common law
56
states recognize the right, and those that do incorporated the right recently.
Moral rights are rarely recognized in the common law,5 7 especially when
they interfere with economic interests.
2.

The Berne Convention

The controversy created by the European Union's proposed directive is
not the first clash between civil and common law countries created by the
droit de suite. In 1886, ten countries signed the Berne Convention, created
for the recognition of international copyright 8 The conferences leading up
to the convention's creation involved arguments between the civil law
countries, 59 who wanted to include more rights for individual authors and
artists, and countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who
wanted the individual countries to control those rights. 60 France and the
United Kingdom were on opposite sides of the issue. 6 1 Despite their
distinct copyright philosophies, both countries were original signatories.62
However, the Convention failed to create a universal copyright law, as the
French had hoped; 63 the countries involved had rejected the French proposal
that included droits d'auteur (rights for individual authors).64
By 1948, the Convention had thirty-seven members.65 That year they
met in Brussels to revise the Convention.66 The final right added to the
53Id.at 338.
14

Id. at 335-36.

55 Groves, supranote 15, at 3.
56

See id.

57 Id. Historically, common law deals mainly with economic rights, and moral rights, if

observed at all, tend to be a recent addition superseded by economic interests.
58 Burger, supra note 4, at 15.
In the century since the creation of the Convention,
countries have continued to sign the treaty. In 1988, the United States signed the
Convention. Id. As of March 23, 2004, over 150 states had become parties to the
convention. See Contracting Parties to the Berne Convention, World Intellectual Property
Organization at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html (last visited March 30,
2004).
59 See Burger, supra note 4, at n.367.
60 Id. at 13-14.
61 Id. at n.367.
62 Id. at n.88.
63 Id. at n.367.
64 Id. at 13-14.
65

Id. at 29.

66

Id.
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revision was the droit de suite.67 The contracting countries, however,
agreed that the droit de suite would not be a minimum Convention
requirement.
An author could claim the right "only if legislation in the
country to which the author belongs so permits." 69 The Convention
members could choose whether to enact it and, if they did, what the terms
would be.7 ° Yet, the revision reflected the growing acceptance of the right
internationally and a desire among some nations that the right become
universal. 7'
3. How the droit de suite never came to be in the UnitedKingdom
The United Kingdom chose not to enact droit de suite legislation.72 In
1971, the British government created the Whitford Committee to examine
the possible effects of implementing the revised Berne Convention,
including the droit de suite.7 In the Committee's 1977 report, it advised
against implementing the droit de suite in the United Kingdom, citing its
inefficacy, the procedural and administrative difficulties of implementation,
and the negative economic effect it would have on the art market. 74
D. The Droit de Suite and the European Union
The European Union takes after the majority of Europe in that its
system is derived from civil law. 75 Of the six original member states, five
had systems based on civil law, 76 and therefore "community law bears a
strong imprint of the French legal system., 77 As a result, French civil law,
from which the droit de suite originates, influences the European Union's
substantive law. 78 Judges and the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") do
contribute some common law influences to the European Union, but the
system is still very much grounded in civil law, especially when it comes to
its statutes and directives."
67

Id. at 36.

68

Id.

69

Berne Convention, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 14.

70 id.

See Burger, supra note 4, at 36, n.367.
See Simon Hughes, Equal Treatmentfor Artists Under Copyright Law and the E.U.'s
Droit de Suite, in INTELL. PROP. AND ETHICS 147, 166-167 (Lionel Bently & Spyros
Maniatis, eds., 1998) [hereinafter Simon Hughes, Equal Treatment].
71

72

73 id.

74Id.
75 WALTER CAIRNS, INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 11
76 id.
77 id.
78

id.

79 Id.

(2002).
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The European Union proposed the droit de suite to accomplish a
number of goals. 80 The first goal addresses the particular situation of visual
artists in the European Union; the European Union wants to "redress the
balance between the economic situation of authors of graphic and plastic
works and that of other creative artists., 8 1 By giving the artists a role in the
secondary art market, the European Union hopes to have artists profit from
their artwork even after the original has left their possession. 82 The primary
market involves transactions between artists and buyers; artists usually earn
their money from the primary market. The secondary market involves the
resale of the artwork. 3 The droit de suite seeks to give visual artists an
interest in this market as well.
84
The other goals involve harmonization within the European Union.
Second, because an overreaching goal of the European Union is the
harmonization of its markets,85 the European Union hopes the droit de suite
will harmonize the art markets of the member states. 6 Third, because the
European Union desires the creation of a common market, the European
Union promotes measures that are designed to balance market conditions
among the member states.87 The European Union believed that the states
that do not impose the royalty have an unfair competitive advantage in art
over states that require the royalty. 88 As such, the European Union hopes to
create a level playing field in the art market. 89 Finally, the European Union
wants to "put in place a harmonized legal framework in respect to the resale
right so as to ensure the proper functioning of the market in works of
modem and contemporary art."90 The directive brings the European Union
a step closer to a universal, European copyright law.
The United Kingdom protested the European Union's droit de suite
from its conception. The European Union primarily aimed the proposed
80 The E.U. has listed a number of goals relating to the desirability of a droit de suite
generally. These three goals are goals specifically tailored to the E.U.
81 Commission Opinion on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original
Work of Art, COM(01)47 final at 2 [hereinafter Commission Opinion].

82 Mark A. Reutter, Artists, Galleries and the Market: Historic, Economic and Legal

Aspects of the Artist-DealerRelationships, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 99, 112 (2001).

83 Commission Opinion, supra note 81.
84 See Council Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl.
85 See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, July 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1997) [hereinafter
E.U. TREATY].
86 Commission Opinion, supra note 81.
87 See E.U. TREATY, supra note 85.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.

91 See generally Bell, supra note 8; Linton, supra note 8; Sellars, supra note 8;
Heathcoat-Armory, supra note 8; Moore & Warren, supra note 8.
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directive at the United Kingdom. 92 The European Union perceived that the
United Kingdom's art market was partially so successful because of the
lack of the royalty,93 and the European Union wants other member states to
have a share in the large volume of art work that passes through London
every year. 94 Those employed in the London art market protested the
directive in the media and to their government. 95 Galleries and dealers
argued that the London art market ought to be protected-that instead of
spreading the wealth of its market to other E.U. states, the directive will
chase the business to New York, Geneva, or even Tokyo.96 Even artists
protested the directive. 97 Artists argued that sale prices would drop to
account for the royalty and the directive's resulting administrative costs. 98
They also worried that more sales would become private, thereby avoiding
the royalty. 99
In December 1999, Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, wrote a
letter to the European Commission and the Finnish Presidency of the
European Union offering a compromise on the directive's terms. 0° Other
correspondence followed between the British government and the E.U.
Parliament. The British proposed phasing in the droit de suite over a period
of 15 years; 1 ' but the European Parliament rejected the proposal.1° The
European Parliament also rejected the British proposal limiting payments to
living artists.' 0 3 By early 2000, the British government abandoned its
protest because it realized that the measure would pass;' 0 4 the directive was
subject to majority voting, and the majority of E.U. states already had a
droit de suite and would, therefore, not oppose, or help the United Kingdom
92 See generally Is London done for?, supra note 14.
93 See generally id
94

id.

95 Id.

96 Black & Atkinson, supra note 25; Tiwari, supra note 6; Is London done for?, supra
note 14; Let the bad times roll, supra note 22.

97 See Linton, supra note 8. Artists started an organization called Artists Against Droit
de Suite. Lydiate, supra note 11, at 49. Members include established artists such as David
Hockney, Emma Sergeant, Karel Appel, Sir Anthony Caro, and Sigmar Polke. Id. The
organization organized a poster campaign that argued that the directive "violates artists'
human rights." Id. See also Artists criticize royalties deal, CNN, July 3, 2001 at
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/03/artists.royalties/ (last visited Nov. 23,
2003). It is, however, also important to note that not all artists opposed the directive.
Lydiate, supra note 11, at 49.
98 Tiwari, supra note 6.
99 Id.

100 Bell, supra note 8; Hargreaves, supra note 45.
"' Droit de Suite, 24 INTELL. PROP. NEWSLETTER 3, Aug. 2001.
102 id.
103 Hargreaves, supra note 45.
104 See Black & Atkinson, supra note 25.
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oppose, the directive. 10 5 The only other countries to also oppose the droit
de suite were the Netherlands and Ireland, 10 6 and they did not have enough
additional votes to successfully block the directive. 07 Consequently, the
United Kingdom and the European Union entered into an agreement that
rendered the droit de suite less forceful than it would otherwise have
been.10 8 The agreement gave the United Kingdom more time to implement
0
the directive 10 9 and exempted low-value works from the droit de suite.I
The Council of the European Union adopted the directive on
September 27, 2001.111 In the new directive, the European Union listed the
terms of the droit de suite in detail.' 1 2 The directive requires that all
13
member states incorporate the droit de suite into their national laws;
generally, the droit de suite must provide artists with an inalienable resale
right attached to original works of art. 1 4 The royalty applies only to
transactions that involve an art market professional" 5 and does not apply to
private sales between individuals or sales involving museums, provided that
the museum is non-profit and open to the public." The term of the royalty
is for the artist's life and seventy years thereafter. 1 7 The directive
establishes a graduated series of rates dependant upon the selling price of
the work with the result that the higher the selling price, the lower the
royalty rate.1 8 The rates range from a quarter percent for works selling for
more than EUR 500,000 to four percent for works selling for between the
105Id.
106Parliamentary Debate, supra note 25.

107Id. Ireland and the Netherlands had eight votes between them. The United Kingdom
would have needed eight more votes to succeed in blocking the directive. Id.
108U.K. Patent Office, Annual Report 2002, Chapter 5: The Changing Intellectual
Property

System,

17

available at http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/reports/anrep2002/

chapter5.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Annual Report].
109 Id. at 17.
110Id.

"' Council Directive, supra note 1.
112See generally id.
113See Council Directive, supra note 1, at art. 12.

114Council Directive, supra note 1, at arts. 1, 2. See id. at art. 2 for a description of what

constitutes an original work of art. Some copies such as photographic copies and prints are
also considered original works where the artists produce limited quantities. Id. It is
important to note that the directive is not self-executing. See also Sellars, supra note 8, at
24; David Gourlay and Lisa Sutherland, 2001 Review of the Year, COPY WORLD, Feb. 2002;

Tiwari, supra note 6.
115 Council Directive, supra note 1, at art. 1.
116 Id. at pmbl. § 18. Another possible argument against the droit de suite directive is
that it encourages private sales. Public sales tend to ensure the integrity of the transaction
(i.e. the art is not stolen, etc.).
117See id. at art. 8.

118Id. at art. 4, for the list of rates. These rates do not include the VAT. Id. at art. 5.
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minimum sale price and EUR 50,000.119 It is up to the member states to set
a minimum sale price after which the royalty will be applied; 120 this
minimum price may not exceed EUR 3,000.121 Artists who receive the
royalty from a British sale will receive a minimum royalty of about 76

pounds. 122

The deadline for implementation of these terms is January 1, 2006.123
However, the European Union decided to give an extension, with regards to
benefiting the artists' heirs, to countries that did not have any droit de suite
legislation prior to the directive; 124 the deadline for these countries, which
include the United Kingdom, 125 is January 1, 2010.126 Even then, the
member state may be able to obtain a further extension of two years
provided that it can offer the European Union a persuasive reason for the
extension. 127 It is therefore possible for the United Kingdom to delay the
implementation of the droit de suite for over a decade. Considering the
United Kingdom's dislike for the royalty, it is likely that they will try to put
implementation off for as long as possible.
As a result of the time limitation listed in the directive, the droit de
suite will only affect modem and contemporary artwork. 128 Therefore it
will not affect the antiquities trade and trade of pre-modem (e.g. medieval,
renaissance) artwork. Yet the British response to the droit de suite was so
much stronger than their response to the VAT, which affects all art trades.
While their response is certainly motivated by economic concerns, their
concerns reflect the differences between the common law and civil law
system. 129 Historically, the common law system rarely addresses droits
morals, at least not where they might interfere with economic concerns.
The common law system has little precedent for the French concept of
moral rights, and as a system based upon
precedent, the common law
°
system fails to support the droit de suite.I

119 Id. at art. 4.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122

Tiwari, supra note 6.

123

Council Directive, supra note 1, at art. 12.

Id. at art. 8, 12.
Simon Hughes, Equal Treatment, supra note 72, at 166-67.
126 Council Directive, supra note 1, at art. 12. See also Gourlay and Sutherland, supra
note 114, at 25.
127 Council Directive, supra note 1, at art. 12.
124

125

See id. at art. 8.
See Burger, supra note 4, n.367.
130 When this comment refers to moral rights, it is purely referring to the French concept
of droits morals. One should not interpret this phrase to include any law with a moral
rationale (e.g. laws against crimes).
128

129
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III. IMPLEMENTING THE DROITDE SUITE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The European Union has put forth three major goals for the droit de
suite directive. 131 However, it seems unlikely that the directive will
accomplish these goals, at least not in the way the European Union hopes. It
is debatable whether its first goal, to provide artists with what the European
Union considers an important right that addresses their economic situation
and gives them recognition,132 would have much effect. General reasons for
the droit de suite include creating an incentive for artists to create, 33 giving
visual artists a comparable interest in their work as authors and musicians
have in their works, 134 allowing the starving artist to profit off his/her
growing reputation, 35 etc. 136 Arguments against these goals include the
assertion that the remote possibility of a royalty years down the road will
not inspire an artists to create 137 (i.e. no one goes into visual art for the
money), the probability that even if an artist's works bring in a large
profit 3 (which for most artists is unlikely), the works are not likely to
appreciate until after the artist's death, etc. 139 There are also more
complicated economic arguments about the artist's role in the market that
question whether potential appreciation is factored into the original selling
price140 or whether the droit de suite will discourage transactions and lower
selling prices.' 4' Whether the droit de suite actually helps artists has been
argued for decades with no definite conclusion. The purpose of this
comment is not to rehash the arguments against the droit de suite in general,
but to present the specific impracticalities presented by the European
Union's droit de suite directive in the United Kingdom.
These specific impracticalities emerge in the European Union's second
and third goals. The bulk of the arguments against the droit de suite argue
the ineffectiveness of the European Union's second objective, namely to
harmonize the art trade in the European Union. 142 The European Union
hopes that the directive will eliminate competition among the European

131See Council Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl.
132 Id. at pmbl. §§ 2-4.
133 See Carleton, supra note 7, at 534-5.
134 McAndrew & Dallas-Conte, supra note 48, at 19.
135 Tiwari, supra note 6; Johnson, supra note 3.

136 Johnson, supra note 3; Stanford, supra note 7, at 1-2.
137 Carleton, supra note 7, at 534-5; see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 501.
138 Tiwari, supra note 6.

9 See id.
140 See Stanford, supra note 7, at 7-9 (discussing of the economic arguments against the
droit de suite).

141McAndrew & Dallas-Conte, supra note 48, at 19.
142 Council Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl. See generally Is London done for?, supra
note 14; Tiwari, supra note 6.
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Union's art markets 143 and give other cities or countries a slice of London's
lucrative art business. 44 Opponents of the directive argue that London will
lose art business, but not to E.U. member states. 45 They claim the business
will go to New York instead of other E.U. cities. 146 The European Union's
art market would be harmonized in the sense that there would be a
harmonized lack of art business, but this result would be at the expense of
the European Union as a whole. 14 7 The British solution to the issue of
harmonization is that the European Union should just get rid of the droit de
suite altogether,148 an argument that never received much consideration.
A. Harmonizing the Market or Destroying the Market?
Opponents of the droit de suite make one major and one minor
argument as to why the London art business will go to New York and not to
other E.U. states. First, the droit de suite will raise prices, and buyers will
go to New York where prices are lower because there is no added droit de
suite.149 The rise in price will not only reflect the actual royalty, but also
the administrative costs, not to mention the burden of dealing with the
bureaucracy resulting from the directive.' 50 Second, while London's long
history and depth of art expertise will continue to attract some buyers,' 51 the
other E.U. countries lack the expertise that will attract buyers necessary to
expand their markets. 52 The main point of both of these arguments is that
the addition of the droit de suite will create enough of a disincentive for art
buyers to move away from the London art market,' 53 but the directive will
offer nothing
that will make the art markets in other E.U. states more
54
attractive.

143
144
145
146

Council Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl.
Is London done for?, supra note 14.
Id.; see Linton, supra note 8.
Let the bad times roll, supra note 22; Is London done for?, supra note 14; Linton,

supra note 8.
147 Is London done for?, supra note 14; see TEFAF, supra note 21.
148 Cait Murphy, How the French Killed Their Art Market, FORTUNE, Dec. 20, 1999, at

62.
149

See Is London done for?, supra note 14.

Cf Gerhard Pfennig, Study, Practical

aspects of the exercise of the droit de suite, including in the digital environment, and its
effects on developments in the international art market and on the improvement of the
protection of visual artists, prepared at the requests of UNESCO's Secretariat, Mar. 27,
2001, § 11, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/copyright/images/IGCXI16.rtf (last
visited Nov. 13, 2003).
150 Linton, supra note 8; Lydiate, supra note 11, at 49.
151 See Is London donefor?, supra note 14.
152 id.
153Cf Pfennig, supra note 149, §12.
...Cf Murphy, supra note 148, at 62.
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A British study by the Department of Trade and Industry concluded
that if all the works that were eligible for the droit de suite left the London
market (a worst case scenario), the London art market would lose £68
million annually and up to 5,000 jobs. 155 Other sources report that the
56
United Kingdom has forecasted the loss of 8,500 jobs in auction houses.
If London only lost trade originating in E.U. member 57states then the
projected loss would be £17 million in fees and 1,300 jobs. 1
Supporters of the droit de suite have a response to naysayers. First,
they explain that the aforementioned numbers represent a worst case
scenario. 5 8 In actuality, not all of the sales affected by the droit de suite
will leave London. 5 9 Loyalty and the draw of London's expertise will help
to retain a number of sales. 6 0 However, money is a strong consideration
for most people in the business of buying and selling, and while the worst
case scenario may not occur, some sales will definitely be lost to New York
or Switzerland. 1Y Supporters of the royalty respond that, in many cases, the
cost of transporting the art will outweigh the potential royalty, thereby
keeping the art in London for sale. 62 Yet, much of the art traded in the
London art market is imported from elsewhere. 163 In these cases, the
transportation costs already exist, and it is only a matter of changing the
destination.' 64 Proponents of the directive dismiss the economic complaints
with the response that the directive is necessary to achieve higher goals
such as universal copyright law and support of the powerless artist. 165 One
can respond to both arguments by speculating that perhaps the cure is
disproportionate to the problem. Does the droit de suite redress the
perceived problem to the point that it is worth losing art business? (Even if
the worst-case scenario does not occur, London will surely lose some
business because of the royalty). The British are not denying the plight of
the artist when they protest the directive. Instead, they protest the cost of
providing the droit de suite. When the House of Lords debated the
directive, one of the main areas of contention was the European Union's
failure to create a cost-benefit analysis of the directive. 66 The United
155Parliamentary Debate, supra note 25.

156Hargreaves, supra note 45; Bell, supra note 8.
157 Id.

158Is London done for?, supra note 14.
159 id.
160Id.
161 Id.
162 id.
163Id.

164id.

165See Simon Hughes, Equal Treatment, supra note 72, at 186-192; see also Written
Question No. 51/98, supranote 29.
166 Id.; Parliamentary Debate, supra note 25 (confirmed by Lord Haskel).
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Kingdom questions the benefit of the droit de suite compared to the cost.
If the art market is going to suffer, it should be for a purpose, and the
solution should be proportional to the problem.

B. Harmonizing the Legal Framework: Is it even possible?
The third goal of the European Union's directive is the most
problematic. The European Union wants to impose the droit de suite in
England to harmonize the law within the European Union regarding artists'
resale royalties. 168 This goal presents a problem because England has a
different system of law from the European Union and most of its member
states. Moreover, England has a different system of law from the system of
law in which droit de suite originated.
[T]he common-law countries.. .historically not only have failed to make
explicit provision for such continuing rights of artists in their work but
have legal regimes that effectively render unenforceable any effort by an
individual artist to craft and retain such rights in his69own creations after
he has transferred the other elements of ownership.1
1. Is Droit de Suite a Moral or Economic Right?
The droit de suite goes hand-in-hand with moral rights. 170 English
copyright law is based on economic rights, not moral ones, 171 a marked
difference from the French civil copyright law from which droit de suite
evolved. 72 Most proponents of the droit de suite argue that it is an
economic right, 173 because it protects an economic interest.i 74 However,
despite having some of the properties of economic rights, it has enough
characteristics 75of a moral right to make it unfamiliar to common law
copyright law. 1

The purpose of the droit de suite is to give visual artists rights and
167 See Tiwari, supra note 6.

Council Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl.
169 Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 17, at 96.
170 Marina Santilli, United States' MoralRights Development in European Perspective, 1
168

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 89, 107 (1997); see also cf Geri J. Yonover, Artistic Parody:
The PrecariousBalance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 79, at n. 34 (1996).
171 Cf David R. Toraya, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign Copyright Infringement
Actions - An Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 1165, n.155
(1985).
172 Frazier, supra note 16, at 335-36.
173 Carleton, supra note 7, at 533; Santilli, supranote 170, at 107.
174 Carleton, supra note 7, at 533; Santilli, supra note 170, at 107.
175 Cf Toraya, supra note 171, at n.155.
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economic incentives similar to those the law gives to authors and
musicians.176 Unlike artists, authors make their money from copies of the
original, not the original work itself.177 The situation is similar for
musicians who can also realize profit in recordings of their works; 178 the
original sheet music and lyrics are not a source of profit for most
musicians.179 Although copies of artwork can make the artist some
money, 180 it is usually not until the original amasses significant value that
copies attract any value. Often, by the time the work accumulates value it is
The profit goes to the owner of the work,
no longer in the artist's hands.'
not the artist who created the work. 182 The droit de suite seeks to redress
this injustice by allowing artists to profit off their growing reputations. 8 3
What makes the droit de suite not an economic right, but a moral right,
is its inalienability. 84 The right is inalienable and "presumes to know what
is best for the artist, and insists that the artist accept its remedy in the form
it prescribes.' 85 The idea behind the droit de suite is that an artist's work is
an extension of his/her personality and just as one cannot separate oneself
from one's personality, one cannot entirely separate oneself from one's
works of art.' 86 Unlike the writer or musician who may sell his/her
copyright, the artist cannot give away or sell the droit de suite.'87 It is
inalienable; 88 while artists may choose not to enforce the droit de suite
with regards to the sale of one of their works, they cannot legally disown or
disassociate themselves from the work. 189 The reason for the right's
inalienability is to address what the right's creator considered the artist's
lack of bargaining power. 90 The droit de suite's goal is to protect starving
artists who might sell off their copyright interest simply because they are
176 Council Directive, supra note 1; Written Question No. 51/98, supra note 29;
McAndrew & Dallas-Conte, supra note 48, at 19.
177 See id.
178 See id.

179 One could stretch the argument by taking the position that a live performance is
comparable to an original work of art. However, unlike an original work of visual art, a
musical performance is non-transferable.
180
Johnson, supra note 3, at 502-03.
181 See Council Directive, supra note 1; Written Question No. 51/98, supra note 29;
McAndrew & Dallas-Conte, supra note 48, at 19.
182 See id.

183 Council Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl.; Written Question No. 51/98, supra note 29;
McAndrew & Dallas-Conte, supra note 48, at 19.
184 See Carleton, supra note 7, at 536-37.
185 Id. at 534.
186 Frazier, supra note 16, at 336.
187 Tiwari, supra note 6.
188 Id.
189 Id.

190 Carleton, supra note 7, at 536-37; Johnson, supra note 3, at 503.
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unable to make a sale without relinquishing their future right to royalties; 91
the droit de suite would supposedly redress a perceived lack of bargaining
power. 192
The inalienability of the right puts the artist in a special class. Legal
193
scholars have argued the necessity of singling out the artist in such a way.
In large measure, however, the proposition that visual artists are in poor
bargaining positions and that therefore a waivable proceeds right would
not be useful, follows from the droit de suite's romantic stereotype of
the impoverished artist ... [I]t remains unclear whether artists in general
are more or less financially secure than the population as a whole.'9
Why should visual artists be afforded a legal protection that musicians,
authors, and inventors, who may be similarly disadvantaged, are not
afforded?
The United Kingdom's response to the moral argument that artists
require this inalienable right to address their unique situation argues that
there are a number of organizations and grants that exist to help
(impoverished) artists.1 95 These organizations and grants do not require
commercial success before helping the artist; the droit de suite is only
successful if the artist achieves some success because the work must sell for
96
considerable amount before the royalty rate applies and the artist profits.'
Another argument against the intentions of the droit de suite is that the
right does not redress the wrong it presupposes exists. Few artists ever
become commercially successful.1 97

Those who do are probably not

starving, and the small profit (maximum about £7,820) 98 that might come
from the royalty is not going to make the difference to them that it would
make to a starving artist. 1 9 Furthermore, even fewer artists achieve
commercial success during their lifetimes; 200 in those cases the royalty go to
his/her heirs, 20' who arguably put no more work into the artwork than the
person who is selling the work.
Another argument against the efficacy of the droit de suite takes the
side of the investor. It questions whether art should be treated differently
191Carleton, supra note 7, at 536-37.
192Id.

193See generally id.
1' Id. at

537-38.

195Parliamentary Debate, supra note 25.
196See Tiwari, supra note 6.

197See generallyMcFarlane, supra note 1, at 1291.
198Tiwari, supra note 6.
199See Black & Atkinson, supra note 25.
200 See generallyMcFarlane, supra note 1; Tiwari, supra note 6.

201Council Directive, supra note 1, at art. 6.
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When an artist becomes
from any other investment, e.g. stocks.2 °2
successful, 20 3the investor collects the reward for making a good
However valid the argument may be, it is rarely successful
investment.
because it seems so cold. An artist is a person, not a business in which one
buys stock. Moreover, art tends to involve emotion, which tends to conflict
with business practice. Ideally, one buys art because of an emotional or
aesthetic response, not because of a calculated investment. However, this
argument is naive; numerous goods exchange hands because of an
emotional response-clothing, cars, and furniture are only a few examples.
Despite art's non-economic qualities, it is still a commodity that is
exchanged for money.
The legal argument against the success of the droit de suite in the
United Kingdom begins with it being a moral right. "Much hostility results
from the natural-law, not economic, roots of moral rights." 2°4 Some sources
claim that the droit de suite is not, in fact, a moral right, but simply related
to moral rights.2 °5 Yet it was created in a copyright system based on moral
rights.2 ° 6 Regardless of whether it is simply a moral right or related to them,
droit de suite traditionally does not exist in systems that are not based in
moral rights.2 °7 The droit de suite is considered a droit moral in French civil
law. 20 8 "French law ultimately evolved to see moral rights as perpetual
rights of personality, completely separate from any economic rights of the
artist., 20 9 The right's inalienability also adds to its identity as a moral right;
the inalienability of the right creates a legal link between artists and their
works that is more than economic. 2 10 The work becomes inextricable from
the artist's personality; death is the only way the artist ever severs his/her
relationship with his/her art. E1 '
The Droit de Suite in a Common Law System
212
As mentioned infra, moral rights are a product of civil law.
Common law does not give much consideration to moral rights,2 13
2.

See Johnson, supra note 3, at 502.
203 See Stanford, supra note 7, for an argument based in economic theory as to how the
202

future possibility of appreciation is factored into the original selling price.
204 Frazier, supra note 16, at 337.
205 Carleton, supra note 7, at 530.
206 See Frazier, supra note 16, at 335-36, 338.
207
See Toraya, supra note 171, at 1191 n.155.
208 Frazier, supra note 16, at 335.
209 Id. at 336.
210 See id.
211 See id. at 336 n.176. One could simplify the difference between moral rights and
economic rights as one of right versus privilege. See Toraya, supra note 17 1, at 1191 n. 155.
212 Frazier, supra note 16, at 335.
213 Cf Toraya, supranote 171, at 1191 n.155.
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especially if they interfere with economic undertakings. In the nineteenth
century, while France was undergoing a series of revolutions seeking to
improve the rights of man, the United Kingdom was experiencing an
industrial revolution. As Franze was developing its civil law at this time, it
is not surprising that its law encompasses moral rights and that English laws
seek to preserve economic efficiency.21 4 Those in the common law system
have difficulty accepting the droit de suite because it is a moral right. 21 5 It
has not been until recently that common law systems have begrudgingly
begun to accept16 some form of moral rights in the realm of contract and
copyright law.'
The droit de suite goes against British copyright law which is based on
economic rights.2 17 Moreover, although droit de suite is primarily a tool of
copyright law, it lies at the nexus between copyright, property, and contract
law. The common law supports the freedom to contract and the alienability
of property. 21 8 The droit de suite infringes on both of these principles due
to its inalienability.
British copyright law is based upon the Statute of Anne, which dates
back to 1709.2
The 1774 decision in Donaldson v. Beckett determined
that the Statute of Anne replaced the old common copyright law. 220 The
Statute of Anne provided economic incentives to create works. 22' It did not
include moral rights for authors.222 Even though the statute was mostly
concerned with copyrights for written works, it created the basis for British
copyright law-that economics would drive copyrights. 223 The specific
This statement is an over-generalized summary of French and British legal history.
However, this statement could present an interesting paper topic. Another interesting topic
could be a comparison of the French and British legal attitudes toward profits versus noneconomic goals.
215 Cf. Toraya, supra note 171, at 1191 n.155.
216 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 17, at 97, 100, 129. Moral rights include more
than just the droit de suite. Some common law states have adopted laws giving the artist the
moral rights of attribution and integrity. The right of attribution gives artists the right to
have their name associated with their work even after the work has left their ownership. The
right of integrity gives artists the right to object if their work is altered after it has left the
artists' ownership. Id. at 99, 130. The success of the droit de suite in other common law
states is discussed infra I1I.B.3.
217 Cf. Yonover, supra note 170, at 86 n.34.
218 Benjamin S. Hayes, Integrating Moral Rights into US. Law and the Problem of the
Works for Hire Doctrine, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1021-22 (2000); see also David S. Cowan,
The Futurefor Land Law, 142 NEW L.J. 1016, 1017 (1992).
219 David S. Cowan, The Futurefor Land Law, 142 NEW L.J. 1016, 1017 (1992).
220 Burger, supra note 4, at 6 n.25.
221 See Statute of Anne, 8 Ann, c. 19 (1709) (Eng.) (cited in Yonover, supra note 170, at
214

86 n.34).
222 Groves, supra note 15, at 3.
223 Burger, supra note 4, at 6 n.25.
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copyright laws have changed, but the economic basis remains. As the
Whitford Committee Report testified, inalienable rights are not part of the
"normal practice" of U.K. copyright law.224
However, in 1988, the United Kingdom "reluctantly" recognized
moral rights in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988.22 The
government included these rights in order to ratify the 1971 Paris Text of
the Berne Convention, a requirement for E.U. Member States.226 The moral
rights received only limited recognition 227 and the droit de suite was not
included in the act. However, the moral rights created in Britain are weaker
than their counterparts in civil law countries.2 28 The rights were "narrowly
defined," and they had to be asserted in writing; 229 in France, the right is
automatic.23 ° Also, while the moral rights do retain some of their
inalienability, in that an artist cannot pass them on to another person, they
lose a lot of their strength because they can be waived in writing. 23 1 It is
apparent that the United Kingdom desired to appease the requirements of an
international treaty while making sure the rights have as little effect as
possible.232 In the fifteen years since the United Kingdom allowed for
moral rights, there has been only one case involving them,233 and the case
"falls well short of providing
a ringing endorsement of this novelty in
23 4
[U.K.] copyrights law.
Although the British do not acknowledge a royalty right when an artist
sells a work, they do recognize a reproduction right separate from the work
itself. In 1910, an Act of Parliament recognized the artist's right to control
and profit from reproductions even after the artist sells the work.235 While
this act may seem like a concession to those supporting moral rights for
artists, it is strictly economic in nature. The artist may transfer this right to
anyone the artist chooses.236 It lacks the inalienability that characterizes
droits morals. This act therefore does not interfere with alienability of
224 Simon Hughes, Equal Treatment, supra note 72, at 167.
225 Groves, supra note 15, at 3.
226 Id.at 3, 4.

227 See id.at 3. These rights included the right to paternity (right to be acknowledged at
the work's author/creator) and a limited right to integrity (right to object to unjustified
modification of the work that would harm the author's/creator's reputation). Id. These
rights apply to authors of written works as well as visual artists. See id.
228 Id.
229 ld.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Cf id.
233 Id.

234 Id. See also Tidy v. Natural History Museum, IPR 501 (1995).
235 Johnson, supra note 3, at 502-03.
236 id.
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property or the freedom to contract; it merely acknowledges
that ownership
23
of the artwork and the right to reproduce it are separate. f
Civil copyright law is not purely based on economic incentives.
Instead it focuses on an artist or author's bond with his/her work.238 The
right is automatic. "There are no provisions for such formalities as
copyright notice, registration of ownership, deposit of copies, etc.," all of
which are characteristics of common copyright law.239
Common property law presents another problem for -the droit de suite.
One of the policies underlying common property law is the alienability of
property. 240 "The free alienability of property has arguably been one of the
central government policies over the past 15-20 years."2 4' Under the droit
de suite an artist can never truly sever ties to his or her art. Even if the artist
wishes to disassociate him/herself from the work, the best the artist can do
is to avoid collecting the royalty. It follows then that the owner of the
physical work cannot claim full ownership. The moral rights enacted in
1988 did not infringe upon the alienability of property because they could
be waived,242 thereby disassociating the creator from the work.
There is a broader argument against the directive asserting itself in
British law. Article 222 of the European Community explains that the
Treaty shall not interfere with the "national laws governing the system of
property ownership. 243 For the above reasons, the directive interferes with
property ownership in the United Kingdom, both in actuality and policy.
Beyond interfering with the ability to buy and sell property, the directive
interferes with another British policy. The Whitford Committee disagreed
with the fact that the droit de suite does not end with the artist but passes to
the artist's heirs.244 The Report claimed that the "present climate of opinion
is against inherited wealth. 24 5
(One need only look at the United
Kingdom's
high
inheritance
taxes
to
note that the government promotes this
24 6
policy.).
237
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Common practice has rendered the argument one could make using
Article 222 moot. The European Union frequently interferes in property
law, and directives are a way to get around the article. Instead of being
seen as the European Union interfering with national law, directives merely
require the member state to "adjust" their national laws themselves.247
The directive also conflicts with common contract law, which reflects
the policy of freedom to contract.24 8 Freedom to contract signifies that
parties can enter into a contract with as little government interference as
possible. The doctrine developed through nineteenth century court cases,
but the early and mid-twentieth century saw a decline in support for this
policy. 249 However, classical law was not completely expunged from the
books; around 1980, courts began to revert back to classical doctrines and
once again stressed the importance of freedom to contract.
The droit de suite interferes with the freedom to contract by creating
an encumbrance on a work of art. 51 When attempting an art transactions,
buyers and sellers must consider both the royalty and fact that the artist (or
his/her heirs) will continue to have an interest in the work. The parties
cannot contract for these rights, due to the right's inalienability. 25 The
1988 enactment of limited moral rights did not necessarily interfere with the
freedom to contract; many contracts included waivers of the limited moral
rights that the United Kingdom created in 1988.253 Furthermore, the royalty
is based on the presumption that the artwork will appreciate. 5 4 The droit
de suite directive fails to consider the possibility that a work may not
increase in value and may even decrease, thereby forcing the seller to lose
money in a sale should the work fail to appreciate, or the work
depreciates. 255 The seller cannot even contract to protect him/herself from
this possibility.
Proponents of the right might argue that the droit de suite is a valid
infringement on the freedom to contract because it addresses a perceived
pay a tax rate of 40%. Inland Revenue, Inheritance Tax: An Introduction, availableat http://
www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/pdfs/iht3.htm.
247 VRANKEN, supra note 243, at 217.
248 Hayes, supra note 218, at 1021-22.
249 P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 15 (1995).
250 Id. at 27.
25 1 Toraya, supra note 171, at n.155.

252 Tiwari, supra note 6.
253 Groves, supra note 15, at 4. Contracts usually included these waivers because one of
the contractors did not want to "risk infringing an extraneous legal right of doubtful event."
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254 See Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights Protection and Resale Royalties for Visual Art
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imbalance in bargaining power.
The argument is based on two
assumptions. The first is that the artist is impoverished-a "starving
artist"-and therefore unable to walk away from a deal, however bad it is.
There has been little research (none offered by the European Union) to
support this stereotype. The second is that the artwork will appreciate,
excluding the artist from the major source of profits. 6 Few artists find
commercial success within their lifetimes. 57 While the droit de suite may
protect a few artists, one might question whether the measure used to
address the situation is proportionate to the weight of the problem.
A further problem arises with the common law use of precedent.
While the directive does not conflict with stare decisis, the interaction
between the two could create a predicament. In civil law countries, the civil
code is considered the definitive source of law and is written with the intent
that it will provide a rule for any case coming before the court.258
"Europeans are more comfortable legislating broad principles whose
ultimate effect is less known. 25 9 Precedent is not binding in civil law.26 °
On the other hand, English common law relies on precedent as a source 2of
61
law; judges' interpretation of the law can be binding on other courts.
While judges in civil law countries, such as France, do have to interpret the
statutes, their interpretations are not binding on other courts. 2 6 2 Moreover,
civil law and common law methods of interpretation differ.2 63 Civil law
judges are more likely to look at the intent of what they are interpreting, 264
while English common law judges will first look at the terms or language to
assemble the meaning.265 The differing methods of interpretation and the
English rule of precedent could lead the droit de suite to have implications
never intended by the directive or even the civil law from which it came.
The directive only intends for the member states to pass the droit de
suite as a resale royalty. In a civil law country, the right is not likely to go
beyond the resale right unless the government adds new rules to the civil
code. However, there is a remote possibility in a common law system that a
court case could extend the law beyond its original intention. For example,
hypothetically, a court could determine that the artist, having a pecuniary
256
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interest in the art which he/she has sold, has a right to protect the interest by
having a say in the work's display or destruction. The droit de suite does
not currently include these rights, and while such a case is unlikely, it is not
impossible.
Today, though, British methods of interpretation are changing, partly
because of the European Union.266 In one court decision, Lord Denning
explained,
Seeing these differences [between British and E.U. interpretation], what
are the British Courts to do when they are faced with the problem of
interpretation? They must follow the European pattern. No longer must
they examine the words in meticulous detail. No longer must they argue
about the precise grammatical sense. They must look to purpose or
intent.267
However, Denning was considering a case involving a European
Union regulation; regulations do not require a corresponding national law,
as directives require. Yet if the British court looks to the intent of the law
instead -ofthe wording, it is unlikely that it will stray far from the European
Union's intention of limiting the directive to resale rights.
3. Enforcement
Two enforcement issues face the directive. The first one confronting
the European Union is compelling the United Kingdom to comply with the
directive. Not only does the European Union have to ensure that the United
Kingdom creates a droit de suite as part of its national law, but the
European Union must also determine whether the United Kingdom enforces
that new law. Enforcement will also create a problem for the United
Kingdom; the United Kingdom faces the issue of determining how to
enforce the droit de suite and how to resolve the burden of enforcement.
The United Kingdom has until 2006 to implement the droit de suite
directive for the works of living artists268 and until 2010 to implement the
directive for the works of dead artists.269 If the U.K. applies for and
receives an extension, it will have until 2012.270 Member states are
supposed to report to the Commission when they adopt the law, and they
should also keep the Commission informed of the content of their droit de
suite laws. 27' There is no specific penalty listed for failure to implement the
266 See H.P. Bulmer Ltd v. J. Bollinger, S.A. I Ch. 401 at 425 (C.A. 1974).
267 Id. at 426.
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directive, but if the United Kingdom fails to comply or if its measures on
enforcement are not strict enough, the European Commission will likely
bring an action in the ECJ.272 The ECJ is the judicial branch of the
European Union; the court is "the unifying force in the application and
interpretation of Community Law., 2 73 The United Kingdom would have to
deal with the ECJ if it did not comply with the directive or if its national
laws did not produce the result the directive requires. 274 The ECJ can
command compliance and impose a periodic fine if the United Kingdom
fails to comply by a certain date. 275 It is highly unlikely that the United
Kingdom would resist the European Union to this level because it seems
that there would be little point to it.
It is easier to determine how the European Union will enforce its
directive than to figure out how the United Kingdom will enforce the droit
de suite as part of national law. For the former there are established
methods of enforcement, but for the latter the United Kingdom must
discover a way to enforce the droit de suite. While the directive does make
some provisions that will aid in enforcement, it does not specifically
explain what method the member states should employ in creating the droit
de suite.276 It requires art market professionals to report sale information if
the artist requests it in respect to royalty collection.27 7 The directive,
however, also mentions that the artists are responsible for managing the
royalty sums and "may arrange for collective management.', 278 Despite
these provisions, a number of questions remain. How will the artists
Who will oversee the process of collection
manage the royalty?
management? While the European Union has placed the burden on the
artist to alleviate any burden the directive might place on the state,279 the
directive fails to consider how exactly the royalty is enforced. What
happens if the seller refuses the royalty? Who resolves disputes? The state
cannot ignore these questions without ignoring the droit de suite. With the
European Union checking on the member state's enforcement of the droit
de suite, it is important for the United Kingdom to devise an effective
method of enforcement.
In France, artists' societies track the sale of art and enforce the
272
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collection of the droit de suite. This is essentially what the directive has in
mind when it suggests artists use collective management. ' ° The United
Kingdom points out that these societies are inefficient.2 8' It takes money to
run these societies, and with the exception of a few famous artists, most of
the royalties will be small especially in comparison to costs of collection.282
SPADEM, one of the main collecting societies in France, filed for
bankruptcy because the amount it collected was not enough to cover the
running costs of the society, despite collecting for the heirs of Matisse and
Picasso.2 83 Proponents of the directive claim that collecting societies can
efficiently distribute royalties.2 84 They cite computers as decreasing the
costs of running a society, pointing to Denmark's system as an example. 85
Then again, Denmark is small country with a small art market.
The Whitford Committee suggested in 1977 that, if implemented, the
right should be treated like any other copyright, with the burden on the
artists to administer the right.28 Ordinarily, when one person fails to pay
another person money owed, a person can sue. However, with the
exception of the occasional major art sale, the royalty will not be enough to
warrant the cost of a court case.287 Also, artists would have the difficult
burden of tracking the sales for their works of art. While the artists could
assign an agent the task of administering their droit de suite right, again the
costs of enforcing the resale right may be more than the royalty received
from the sale. 288 Additionally, this method of enforcement may not satisfy
the European Commission as rigorous enough. While the directive purports
to place the administrative burden on the artists, 2 89 the artists will require
state support to collect the royalty from unwilling sellers. Another option
for enforcement is to institute a criminal penalty for noncompliance. There
are no examples of any system having done this with the droit de suite.
However, once again the costs may outweigh the benefits; the exception
being that the state, instead of the artist, takes on the enforcement costs.
Of the twenty-nine jurisdictions worldwide that impose some form of
the resale right in their laws, twenty-four apply the right rarely or not at
all.2 90 The United States operates under common law as well, and one of its
280
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states has passed a statute creating a droit de suite.291 In 1977, California
passed the Resale Royalties Act, which required the seller of work of fine
art to pay the artists five percent of the sale, provided that the seller lives in
California or the sale takes place in California.2 92 The resale right, like the
one in the European Union's directive, is inalienable.293 Scholars have
noted the problem California has enforcing its statute.2 94 In California, the
burden is on the seller to locate the artist and pay the royalty; 295 however, it
is still up to the artist to enforce their right to the royalty, 29 6 which is often
prohibitively expensive.29 7 While the Supreme Court has upheld the statute,
litigation is costly and the costs would most often outweigh the benefit of
the royalty. 298 Again, there is the problem of even discovering that such a
sale had been made. "The little evidence available indicates that the Act is
ineffective29 9 and practically unenforceable... the law has generally been
ignored.

Does the California statute predict the fate of the British droit de suite?
Part of California's problems with enforcing its Resale Statute may come
from possible conflicts with federal law. 300 The United Kingdom does not
have that problem because the droit de suite will be national law. However,
the controversy surrounding the droit de suite will not likely allow the
laissez faire approach like Californians have towards to the resale right.
The European Union and supporters of the right will demand more rigorous
enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION

The European Union's droit de suite directive presents a series of
problems for the United Kingdom. London's lucrative art business stands
to lose profit and sales; those in the art business are consequently worried
about their jobs. 30 ' The directive seeks to implement a construct of civil
law in a common law system. Droit de suite's inalienability classifies it as
moral right, and the common law rarely recognizes moral rights in the
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realm of contract and copyright law. Furthermore, the droit de suite's
inalienability conflicts with common law policy in the areas of copyright,
property, and contract law. Finally, the droit de suite presents a problem
with enforcement. Established methods to compel the United Kingdom's
compliance with the directive are already in place in the European Union.
Yet, the United Kingdom still must worry about setting up a national
system of enforcement that compels sellers to pay the droit de suite. If the
United Kingdom fails to make an effort to enforce the droit de suite, the
European Union may take action in the ECJ.
These problems create questions regarding the success of the droit de
suite in the United Kingdom and consequently the success of the directive
as a whole. The European Union hopes the directive will give artists
greater rights, harmonize the art markets of the E.U. states, and harmonize
the legal framework regarding the droit de suite in the European Union. In
actuality, the European Union is likely to lose art business to New York
with no benefit to European Union member states, and it is nearly
impossible to harmonize the legal framework with the conflicts presented
by two differing legal systems.
By observing the success or failure of the droit de suite, one can
perhaps foretell the fate of a similar royalty in the United States. There has
been some support in the United States for greater artists' rights, including
the droit de suite, but those attempting to forecast the possible future of the
royalty in the United States predict different outcomes. Some predict that
the droit de suite in the European Union will put pressure on the United
States to enact the droit de suite30 2 and that the United States is already
heading in that direction.30 3 Others claim that the United States and the
34
European Union are heading in opposite directions on the droit de suite; 0
a 1992 Congressionally-ordered study came to a negative, but controversial,
conclusion about implementing the resale royalty in the United States.30 5
The United States also has a system of common law, and it would face
many of the problems the United Kingdom is now facing with regard to the
resale right. (The lack of its success in California is indicative of the
problems one faces trying to institute a droit de suite in a common law
system.) While the effects of the droit de suite may not be apparent in the
United Kingdom for another decade, the United Kingdom's handling of
those problems may determine whether the United States would consider
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instituting the droit de suite. The next likely development to anticipate is
the European Commission's economic study on the competitiveness of the
30 6
market in modem and contemporary art in the European Community.
The Commission plans to have the study completed by January 1, 2009307
and hopes that the results of the study will quiet the arguments against the
droit de suite and even convince countries outside the European Union,
such as the United States, to consider implementing a droit de suite.30 8
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